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1. INTRODUCTION 
The population of most developed societies is ‘graying’.  In many societies workers are 
still retiring at an early age and the replacement generation of young workers is small.1  The 
growing constraints on the funding of pension systems are such that this creates pressure towards 
the postponement of the age of retirement.  However, many employers are reluctant to employ 
older employees, notably because these are believed to be less productive while better paid than 
juniors.  As mentioned in Stephanie Kovalchik, Colin Camerer, David Grether, Charles Plott, 
and John M. Allman (2005), there is indeed a common belief that ability and performance 
declines with aging (also see Ellen M. Peters, Melissa L. Finucane, Donald G. MacGregor, and 
Paul Slovic, 2000).  The tension between this belief and seniority-based wage policies plays 
against the employment of seniors, leading to discrimination against the hiring or the 
employment of seniors (Marc Bendick, Lauren E. Brown, and Kennington Wall, 1999; Peter A. 
Riach and Judity Rich, 2006).2   
The importance of negative stereotypes about seniors (Todd. D. Nelson, 2002) was 
highlighted in a recent OECD report (OECD, 2006).  Survey results show that even in Sweden, 
where the participation rate of seniors is highest, half of all employers believe that seniors are 
less flexible and willing to change.  A survey in the United States reveals that employers believe 
that seniors are more reliable and determined than juniors, but less willing to learn.  Another 
survey indicates that the lower adaptability to technical change is the most common reason 
                                                
1 The labor-force participation rate for employees between the ages of 50 and 64 was only 53% in France and 
Germany in 2003, 67% in the U.S.A., 68% in Japan and 74% in Sweden (OECD, 2006).   
2 In a survey conducted in the United States in 2002, two-thirds of employees between 45 and 75 years of age report 
having witnessed or personally suffered from age discrimination in their company (OECD, 2006).  This seems to be 
particularly true for females: in a labor-market experiment, Joanna Lahey (2005) finds that a younger female worker 
is more than 40% more likely to be offered an interview than an older female worker.   
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French employers state for not employing people over the age of fifty (Olivier Monso and 
Magda Tomasini, 2003).  
To date, economists have focused more on the macro-economic dimensions of aging for 
the future of pension systems and on its micro-economic implications on the labor market than 
on its behavioral implications.  Yet, a behavioral analysis of the impact of aging on decision-
making may help in understanding how firms (and governments) can deal with the major issues 
mentioned above.  In this paper, we investigate three dimensions of worker behavior that seem 
highly relevant for the success of modern organizations.  Two of these are emphasized in Casey 
Ichniowski, Kathryn Shaw, and Jon Gant (2003): attitudes concerning cooperation in teams and 
attitudes concerning competition.  Both cooperation and competition are traits that are valuable 
in a versatile and productive worker – there are times when each will serve the firm’s purposes.  
A third dimension concerns the willingness to take risks; if seniors resist the risks that may be 
involved in innovation, for example, this could lead to a negative influence on firm performance. 
In the experimental literature, one’s attitude concerning cooperation is often measured by 
the analysis of contributions in public-good games.  On the one hand, since we typically observe 
a decay of cooperation over time in these games due to conditional cooperation, we might expect 
experience to lead seniors to be less cooperative.  On the other hand, public-goods provision in 
the workplace typically occurs in an environment where punishment (and even reward) is 
feasible.  Since experimental evidence suggests that the possibility of punishment tends to lead to 
sustained cooperation (Ernst Fehr and Simon Gächter, 2000), so that seniors may well have had 
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more experience that cooperation pays off, we might instead expect seniors to be more 
cooperative.3  
For its part, one’s attitude concerning competition may be approached experimentally by 
the analysis of participants’ choices with competitive and non-competitive payment schemes.  If 
age reduces one’s willingness to compete, we should observe that older people systematically 
select less competitive incentives than juniors.  Alternatively, we can hypothesize that older 
people have better judgment and self-knowledge and are more conditional than juniors in their 
selection of incentives and their attitude towards competition.  
Another issue is the relationship between age heterogeneity and team performance, since 
prolonging the duration of workers’ careers is likely to increase the heterogeneity of the 
workforce.  Barton H. Hamilton, Jack A. Nickerson, and Hideo Owan (2003) find that teams 
with more heterogeneous ability levels are more productive, whereas demographic heterogeneity, 
in terms of ethnicity, gender, and age, has a negative impact on productivity.  However, there are 
other studies in the literature showing that firms who have either a very homogenous or a very 
heterogeneous age structure perform less well than those who have a moderate degree of age 
dispersion (Christian Grund and Niels Westergård-Nielsen, 2005).  Thus, a secondary focus of 
our paper is to investigate whether the levels of cooperation and competition, which condition 
performance, are influenced by the age composition of teams.  Greater age diversity may 
improve performance in joint production if cooperation is lower when teams are age-
homogenous.  This requires us to test whether people cooperate more when teamed with the 
same age group or in mixed groups.  Similarly, greater age diversity in teams may improve 
                                                
3 Indeed, William T. Harbaugh, Kate S. Krause, and Steven J. Liday (2003) find that children are more selfish than 
young adults and that individuals learn to become more ‘fair’ in growing up. 
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performance if both the attraction and the strength of competitive incentives are increased by this 
diversity.  
To address these issues, we consider experimentally the comparative behavior of juniors 
(under 30) and seniors (over 50) in novel subject pools.  First, we conduct experiments with 
employees at two large French firms at their work sites.  Second, we conduct a conventional 
laboratory experiment, where we invite students and retirees.  The laboratory experiment allows 
us to extend the age dispersion in the observations and to make comparisons between the 
working and non-working populations, as only students have no work experience.  Our 
experiments consist of a public-goods (or team-production) game in which we vary whether 
participants are informed about the generation composition of their three-person groups, and a 
real-effort task in which individuals can choose a piece-rate pay scheme or can elect to compete 
against a counterpart for a higher pay rate if successful (but a lower pay rate if unsuccessful).  
We also ask people for their preferences with respect to generation composition at the end of the 
public-goods (team-production) experiment.  Finally, we use a simple decision-making task to 
elicit each individual’s degree of financial risk aversion.  While we recognize that these games 
and tasks are imperfect proxies for important choices in real-world firms, we nevertheless feel 
that they offer some useful insights to appreciate the value of employing seniors that cannot be 
approached by standard survey methods.  
To clarify our contribution, this paper is one of the first attempts to tackle the important 
issue of the interactions between workers of different age groups with both laboratory and 
artefactual field experiments.  Our study is part of a recent trend in experimental economics to 
move beyond the student population to explore the robustness of findings.  We explore the issue 
of the attitudes towards cooperation and competition across a work environment and a laboratory 
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environment, and we bring both students and retirees together in a laboratory.  In addition, we 
provide new results on the impact of generation on the level of cooperation and on the degree of 
competitiveness.  We also examine how people react towards information about the generation 
of team members and by showing how the willingness to cooperate and to compete is affected by 
the generation of the group members.  
Our results show first that seniors are more cooperative than juniors, in the sense of 
making more contributions to team production.  Second, we see no evidence at all that seniors 
are more risk averse in financial decisions. Third, seniors react to incentives and the 
competitiveness of the environment about as strongly as juniors.  These three results are found in 
both the field and laboratory environments.  Finally, we observe beneficial effects in the field 
from having working groups in which there is a mix of juniors and seniors, since working seniors 
increase their contribution when they know they are interacting with juniors; this suggests that 
there are indeed benefits in maintaining a work force with diversity in age.  In addition, workers 
at the two firms in our study reveal a preference for being in age-heterogeneous groups.  Overall, 
the implication is that it may not be wise to exclude seniors from the labor force; instead defining 
additional short-term incentives near the end of a worker’s career to retain and to motivate older 
workers may provide great benefits to society. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  In section 2, we discuss the related 
literature, and in section 3, we describe our experimental methodology.  In section 4, we present 
our results, and in section 5 we discuss the implications of these results.  Section 6 concludes. 
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2. RELATED LITERATURE 
Only a few papers in behavioral economics investigate the dimensions of a declining 
decision-making ability of older individuals.  The study by Kovalchik et al. (2005) compares the 
behavior of healthy elderly individuals (average age 82) and younger students (average age 20) 
with respect to decision-making under uncertainty.  Older individuals do not appear to do 
substantially worse on these decision-making tasks.  Both cohorts displayed overconfidence, but 
this was lower for older individuals at intermediate levels of reported confidence; there were no 
significant differences across age cohorts in the gambling tasks; both cohorts behave similarly in 
the guessing game.   
Some other recent experimental studies have investigated the relationship between trust 
and age, but none investigated the link between age and cooperation or competition. Håkan 
Holm and Paul Nystedt (2004) analyze behavior in the Joyce Berg, John Dickhaut, and Kevin 
McCabe (1995) investment game, with people selected from a public database in Sweden; one 
cohort consisted of people 20 years old, while the other cohort consisted of people 70 years old.  
It was found that the young cohort sent significantly more as first movers than did the older 
cohort. While the average amount returned was similar for both cohorts, the proportions 
dispersed for the older responders, suggesting a greater degree of responsiveness to the 
environment; this result goes against the stereotype that older people are less adaptable.  Other 
studies conducted with representative surveys in Germany (Ernst Fehr, Urs Fischbacher, Bernard 
von Rosenbladt, Jürgen Schupp, and Gert G. Wagner, 2002) and the Netherlands (Charles 
Bellemare and Sabine Kröger, 2007) conclude, however, that older cohorts are less trusting, yet 
are more generous as responders.  Matthias Sutter and Martin Kocher (2007) find that the elderly 
are more reciprocal, in a study with participants ranging from 8-year-old children to people in 
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their late sixties.  In their study, trust increases from early childhood to early adulthood, but stays 
constant thereafter. 
 Among the previous studies, only Holm and Nystedt (2004) manipulate the information 
about the partners’ generation and find that first movers were more trustful with members of 
their own age cohort.  This raises the question of the impact of team composition on behavior.  
Some theoretical and empirical work in personnel economics supports the view that a 
heterogeneous work force is likely to lead to higher productivity if there are useful 
complementarities (see Edward Lazear, 1998 for a theory explaining the development of multi-
cultural teams despite increased costs of communication). Hamilton, Nickerson and Owan (2003, 
2004) provide empirical studies in the garment industry that distinguish between diversity in 
abilities and demographic diversity in teams.  The first type of diversity may enhance 
productivity if there is mutual learning and cooperation, supporting Lazear (1998)’s theory, 
whereas demographic diversity is likely to harm productivity.  Holding the ability distribution 
constant, they observe that teams with more heterogeneity in age are less productive, for three 
possible reasons: an inhibition of knowledge transfer, a reduction of peer pressure due to weaker 
social ties, and a taste for discrimination. 
However, there is no consensus on the impact of age diversity in teams on performance. 
For example, Grund and Westergård-Nielsen (2005) use a comprehensive linked employer-
employee dataset covering all firms and employees in Denmark to estimate the relationship 
between the corporate age structure and the value-added per employee.  They obtain an inverse 
U-shaped relationship between mean age of employees (or age dispersion) and firm 
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performance, suggesting that firms who have either a very homogenous or a very heterogeneous 
age structure perform less well than those who have a moderate degree of age dispersion.4  
 
3. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION 
Our experiment was comprised of three different decision-making tasks, performed in 
sequence.  As mentioned above, we conducted the sessions in both the field and the laboratory. 
 
3.1 The decision tasks 
Each session consisted of a team-production task designed to measure cooperation, a real-
effort task where competition was an integral aspect of the payoff structure, and a simple 
investment decision designed to elicit the individual’s degree of risk aversion. 
The team-production task 
The first task was a standard linear public-good game, featuring groups of three 
participants.5  There were 17 periods in this game, divided into three respective segments of 
eight periods, eight periods, and one period; we varied the sequence in the two eight-period 
segments to mitigate possible order effects.  In one case, participants played a standard public-
good game the first eight periods, in which no information is given about the generation of the 
other players.  This was followed by eight periods in which information is provided about the 
                                                
4 In the vein of Hamilton, Nickerson and Owan (2004), some studies identify a negative correlation between 
heterogeneity in age and within-team cohesion and communication (Todd R. Zenger and Barbara Lawrence, 1989) 
or the growth of sales (Tony Simons, Lisa H. Pelled, and Ken A. Smith, 1999; Jonathan Leonard and David I. 
Levine, 2004).  On the other hand, other studies (Pelled, Kathleen M. Eisenhardt, and Katherine R. Xin, 1999; 
Martin Kilduff, Reinhard Angelmar and Ajay Mehra, 2000) conclude this heterogeneity has a positive impact on 
overall team performance. 
5 We chose to form groups of three participants instead of four (as in many public goods experiments) in order to 
collect more observations, knowing that the number of participants within the companies was necessarily limited. 
We have adjusted the return rate of the investment in the public good so that the incentives to contribute remain 
similar than in the experiments with groups of four players. 
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generation composition of the group.  In the second case, we began with eight periods in which 
information was provided, and followed this with eight periods without this information.   
In both cases, a two-stage game (the ‘selection treatment’) was played in the 17th period.  
In the first stage of this game, each person could select the composition of his or her group; i.e., 
he or she chose to be matched with two juniors, two seniors, or one junior and one senior.6  The 
choice cannot depend on information about the others’ behavior in previous stages of the game, 
but could only be conditional on an exogenous attribute, i.e. the generation.  The second stage of 
the game consisted of the contribution decision, as in the earlier periods. 
At the beginning of each period, each group member i is endowed with 20 units.  Each 
member simultaneously chose a fraction gi of his or her endowment to contribute to a group 
project, while keeping the remainder in his or her private account.  All funds in the group project 
paid a positive return to each member whatever his or her contribution.  The marginal per capita 
return from a contribution to the group project was 0.5; this parameter value meant that full free-
riding was the dominant strategy (assuming selfish preferences), whereas full contribution to the 
public good corresponded to the social optimum.  Subject i’s payoff was given by: 
                                                        
 
π i = 20 − gi + 0.5 g j
j=1
3
∑ .                                                        (1) 
After they have made their contribution decisions, the group members were informed of both the 
amount of the group contribution and their own individual payoffs.  
                                                
6 Each person in the selection treatment was always matched with his or her generation composition (the terms 
“junior” and “senior” refer only to age).  We implemented this as follows: Suppose that person X chose to be 
matched with two seniors.  We randomly drew two seniors in the session and added their contributions to those of 
person X to determine X’s payoff.  Now, suppose that one of these two seniors, person Y, has expressed a 
preference to be matched with two juniors.  We randomly drew two juniors from the population and added their 
contributions to those made by person Y to determine Y’s payoff.  In other words, a participant’s contribution may 
well be added to the contributions of people belonging to different groups.  This artifact guaranteed that each 
person’s matching preference was always respected, and it did not cause any subsequent problems, since this 
procedure was only used in the last period of this one-shot game. 
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The no-information treatment allows us to determine whether juniors and seniors are 
equally cooperative or selfish in a group.  The information treatment informs us about whether 
people condition the contribution to the group project on the generation composition of the 
group, and also indicates whether this effect (if any) differs across generations.  The selection 
treatment tells us about the participants’ preferences between homogenous and heterogeneous 
groups in this game.  
The real-effort competition task 
Our second task consisted of two stages.  In the first stage, people were randomly matched 
in pairs, and each person received information about the generation (junior or senior) of the other 
person.  Each person then simultaneously chose his or her payment scheme, having been 
informed about the task that must be performed in the second stage of the game; this task 
consisted of solving anagrams, as detailed below.  The choice was between a payment scheme 
based on absolute performance and a tournament payment scheme.  Before performing the task, 
each person was informed about his or her co-participant’s choice of payment scheme.   
If an individual chose the pay scheme based on absolute performance, he or she was paid 
18 points for every anagram subsequently solved.  If both people in the pair chose the 
tournament, the person who created most anagrams received 30 points for every anagram solved, 
while the other person received six points for every anagram solved.  In case of a tie, the winner 
was randomly selected.  If only one person chose the tournament, he or she received 30 points 
for every anagram solved. Note that in our tournament, there is no fixed payment from winning 
per se; instead, one’s payoff was increasing in the number of anagrams created, so that there was 
always an incentive to exert full effort, even if one’s co-participant has decided to not compete.  
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After a participant chose a payment scheme and received information about the co-
participant’s choice, he or she had four minutes in which to perform the task.  Anagrams were to 
be solved from a series of seven letters.7  When the allotted time had elapsed, each person was 
only informed about the number of valid words he or she had created and the corresponding 
payoff.  
 Because one’s choice of payment scheme is likely to depend on one’s beliefs about both 
one’s own ability and the ability of the co-participant, we elicited the participants’ beliefs.  After 
choosing a payment scheme but before performing the task, people reported the number of words 
they estimate they could generate in four minutes.  This provides us with a measure of the 
individual’s self-confidence.  Each person also estimated the average performance of juniors and 
seniors in the session.  Every accurate answer paid one additional Euro.  By comparing these 
values, we can observe whether an individual believes he or she is more, less, or equally able 
than the generation of the co-participant; this provides us with a proxy for the individual’s 
relative ability.  We can also measure whether a person believes that seniors are on average less 
able at this task than juniors.  This game indicates whether the attitude towards competition is 
affected by the individual’s generation, and it also provides us with measures of self-confidence 
and stereotypes in relation to an individual’s generation. 
A test of risk aversion 
At the end of the session, we used a parsimonious procedure to elicit an individual’s degree 
of risk aversion, taken from Gary Charness and Uri Gneezy (2003); this allows us to control for 
this attribute in the analysis of the determinants of cooperative and competitive attitudes.  Each 
person was endowed with 100 points and was presented with a one-shot decision task: choose 
                                                
7 We alternated between two series of three vowels and four consonants across sessions to counter the effect of a 
possible dissemination of information between sessions. These combinations offer the same number of solutions.  
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how much of this endowment to invest in a risky asset and how much to keep.  It is common 
information that there is an even chance for the investment in the risky asset to be a success or a 
failure.  In case it fails, the amount invested is lost; in case of a success, the investment returns 
2.5 times its amount.  In addition to the amount of the risky investment, each person chooses one 
of two colors.  If this color is randomly drawn (50% chance), the investment is a success.  Since 
the lottery gives an expected return of 1.25 point for each point invested, a risk-neutral person 
should invest the full endowment in the risky asset.  The lower the amount invested in the risky 
asset, the higher the degree of risk aversion.   This test allows us to measure the sensitivity of 
risk aversion to age.  
The theoretical predictions are of course the same for both juniors and seniors: in the 
team production task, no one should rationally contribute to the public good, and being informed 
about the age composition of the team does not change the sub-game Nash equilibrium.  In the 
real-effort competition task, one should choose the tournament if one believes one’s relative 
ability is higher than that of the potential competitor or if one expects that the pair member will 
stay out of the competition; age only matters if one has expectations about age differences in 
competitiveness or in ability.  In the test of risk aversion, each risk-neutral subject, whatever his 
or her age, should invest all of the endowment. 
 
Artefactual field experiments and lab experiments 
 Our artefactual field experiments (Glenn W. Harrison and John A. List, 2004) were 
conducted with 87 employees of two large private companies in the manufacturing industry in 
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the neighborhoods of Lyon, France.8  We selected initially ten companies with more than 500 
employees; we had interviews in six companies and finally, two were willing to participate in the 
study.  Despite our best efforts, we of course cannot pretend to have a fully representative sample 
of the working population; this is an inherent problem with field experiments where the 
experimenter does not have access to the entire population.  Nevertheless, while it is not possible 
to completely rule out that some of our results are artifacts of the specific groups used in the 
study, our data represent a unique set of information regarding the attitudes toward cooperation 
and competition among juniors and seniors.   
Forty-eight juniors (less than 30 years old) and thirty-nine seniors (above 50 years of age) 
participated in a total of seven sessions.  We used the same recruitment procedures and session 
logistics in both firms and we minimized the likelihood that people who interacted at work 
would participate in the same session.  We wrote the text of the recruiting message that clearly 
mentioned participation in a scientific experiment managed and funded by researchers.  The 
human-resource department in each company recruited subjects by means of email and phone 
calls, with special attention to the balance of occupations (manager or non-manager) in each age 
category but without any other selection criteria.  Participants were allocated to sessions so as to 
maintain a balance in terms of both generations and occupations.9  We asked the HR department 
to compose the sessions so that supervisors were not participating in the same session as their 
workers, and to avoid having people from the same work group allocated to the same session; 
                                                
8 Gambro is a Swedish company and one of the leading makers of products used for dialysis for chronic kidney 
disease.  The Lyon facility produces plastic products for hemodialysers and employs about 600 employees.  Renault 
Trucks whose headquarters are located in Lyon is the second company in importance within the Volvo group, which 
is the leader in truck building in Europe. Although being owned by a European group since 2001, Renault Trucks 
comes from an old French company settled in Lyon since 1894. This firm is relatively archetypical of French large 
industrial company. Its Lyon plant employs about 5,000 employees.  Both firms are in the manufacturing industry 
and practice shift-work; nearly all employees in both companies use computers.  To control for possible differences 
in terms of corporate culture, we systematically introduce an indicator variable for one of the two companies in all 
our regressions; it is rarely significant. 
9 We also asked the HR department to avoid pressuring people to participate. 
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this was feasible since both companies are large.   In this way, we attempted to minimize any 
effects on behavior from anticipated possible repercussions.  The HR people were also aware 
that they were not allowed to reveal the purpose of the experiment to the potential participants, 
or to provide details about the content of the protocol.10  The rules and recommendations were 
the same in both companies.  At the beginning of each session, the participants were reminded 
that no individual data would be communicated to their company and that participation was 
voluntary.  We equipped the rooms in the companies so that the usual laboratory conditions were 
met; each place was separated from the next by mobile fences (see Appendix A in the 
supplemental materials on the AER website).  The experiment was computerized using the 
REGATE program (Romain Zeiliger, 2000). 
The experiment was also conducted with 37 students and 35 retirees, in five sessions at 
the Groupe d’Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), CNRS, France.  The students were 
recruited from undergraduate courses in local Engineering and Business schools, by means of the 
ORSEE software (Ben Greiner, 2004).  This population has almost no work experience 
(typically, less than 3% of the students participating in our experiments have a part-time job 
during their studies).  The retirees were recruited by means of phone calls to local associations 
offering computer classes and to one municipality.11  We also tried to avoid allocating people 
from the same origin to the same session. 
                                                
10  While it would have been somewhat preferable for us to manage this process directly, we did not have access to 
individual information.  Nevertheless, we believe that our requirements were followed and that the employees 
participating in the same session were not more familiar with other participants than the students coming from the 
same School. The experimental environment in the firms and in the laboratory was comparable. 
11 Of course, the retirees in our sample cannot be completely representative, since computer literacy is less common 
for people in this age bracket. According to the 2005 Eurostat Community surveys on ICT usage in enterprises and 
households in the EU-25, 90% of the cohort aged 16-24, 45% of the cohort aged 55-64, and 22% of the cohort aged 
65-74 have at least basic knowledge in computers. In addition, while the replication of the field experiment with 
retirees enables us to extend the age variations in our sample, we acknowledge that if we observe differences 
between working seniors and retirees, we cannot disentangle the respective effects of age, cohort and employment 
status.  
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In total, 159 people took part in this experiment.  The same experimenters ran all of the 
sessions.  Working juniors were on average 25.3 years old (min = 18, max = 29) and working 
seniors were on average 54.1 years old (min = 51, max = 57).  The students were on average 20.6 
years old (min = 18, max = 28) and the retirees were on average 65.9 years old (min = 58, max = 
77).  The distribution of participants in terms of generations was balanced in the two firms 
(48.6% from one firm were seniors and 44.8% from the other firm).  Table 1 shows the number 
of participants and their demographics by location.   
Table 1: Session demographics 
Location Sessions Subjects % Seniors % Managers % Females 
Field 7 87 44.8% 31.0% 43.7% 
Laboratory 5 72 48.6% - 50.0% 
 
   
Upon arrival, the subjects signed a consent form in which they confirmed their voluntary 
participation and acknowledged being informed that they could leave the experiment at any time 
without any sanctions.  At the beginning of the session, participants entered their age on their 
computer and chose between two colors.12  Next, the instructions for the first eight periods of the 
public-good game were distributed and read aloud (see Appendix B in the supplemental 
materials on the AER website).  Instructions were written in neutral terms.  The participants then 
filled out a questionnaire to check their understanding of this game; all questions were answered 
privately.  It was common information that the matching was random and that groups were fixed 
for the first eight periods.  New instructions were distributed for the next eight periods.  People 
were aware that we re-matched the groups for the new series of periods and that the new groups 
                                                
12 We introduced this choice of colors (orange and green) in order to limit the salience of age.  This artifact has 
almost no impact.  The individuals who chose the orange color invested more in the test of risk attitude (5% level of 
significance) but the other decisions are not affected. 
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were fixed for these periods.  Finally, instructions were distributed for the selection treatment in 
period 17.  During this game, a table was displayed on the subjects’ screen, with one row for 
each group member indicating when applicable the color chosen by the participant and his or her 
generation (junior or senior).  In addition, a feedback table was available to remind one of his or 
her own contribution, the amount of the public good, and his or her payoff in each past period. 
At the end of the previous game, we distributed the instructions for the competition game; 
we read them aloud and checked for whether people understood the game.  Each person was then 
informed about the generation and color choice of his or her co-participant and next chose a 
payment scheme.  We then elicited the beliefs about one’s own performance and the 
performance of juniors and seniors.  Next, we read aloud the series of seven letters and started 
the clock.  After four minutes had elapsed, the number of qualifying words was validated.13  
After the completion of this game, we distributed the instructions for the test of risk aversion. 
On average, a session lasted 75 minutes.  At the end of each session, each participant was 
individually given an envelope with a cash payment.  On average, participants earned €24 in 
companies and €22 in the laboratory.14  
4. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
In this section, we first analyze the results of our test of risk attitude.  We then study 
behavior in the team-production game.  Finally, we focus on the attitudes towards competition. 
                                                
13 This part of the experiment was not computerized to avoid potential differences in computer ability. 
14 We attempted to control for the opportunity cost of time for the working population by having the experiments in 
their workplace rather than requiring them to go to the University.  Nevertheless, wealth and income levels 
undoubtedly vary across our subpopulations, so that the payoffs may be more or less salient for these groups.  While 
this seems unavoidable (one would have to offer different payoff conversion ratios for juniors and seniors in the 
same session, creating a confound), we note that behavior in our games and decision tasks seems responsive to the 
incentives that were provided. 
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4.1 Risk attitudes   
In contrast to the idea that seniors would be more risk-averse than juniors, in fact retirees 
invest slightly more than students; the respective means (standard deviations) were 55.57 (26.27) 
and 50.32 (29.21).  Working seniors also invest slightly more than working juniors; the 
respective means (standard deviations) were 59.23 (26.75) and 57.58 (26.15).  No significant 
differences across generations are identified by Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for the equality of 
distributions across the two generations conducted on the pooled dataset (p = 0.396), on the field 
data (p = 0.486), and on the lab data (p = 0.915).  The estimation of a Tobit model (not reported 
here but available upon request) confirms that the amount invested is not influenced by the 
generation, controlling for age and occupation that exert no significant influence either.  Since 
the overall wealth level may differ across juniors and seniors, we wish to be cautious in 
interpreting these results.  Nevertheless, these observations are close to those by Steffen 
Andersen, Harrison, Morten I. Lau and E. Elisabet Rutström (2006), who compare the results of 
a field experiment on risk conducted on a representative sample of the Danish population with 
those from a lab experiment.   
 
4.2 Attitudes toward cooperation in the team-production task 
Figure 1 shows the contribution over time for each group in the team-production task. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
The average contribution in the first 16 periods (exogenous matching) was 4.13 for 
students, 6.41 for working juniors, 7.31 for retirees, and 7.46 for working seniors.15  
Contributions tend to decline over time, as is a standard result in the public-goods game, but the 
contribution of the seniors is higher than that of the juniors in nearly all periods.  We also 
                                                
15 The respective standard deviations were 4.45, 5.38, 5.17, and 5.66. 
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observe the familiar ‘re-start’ phenomenon, where contributions go up after a new group is 
formed in period 9; this is particularly strong for students, perhaps in part because their level of 
contributions is so low by period 8.  Finally, there is a jump in contributions in period 17 (when 
groups are formed endogenously with respect to generation) for every subpopulation, with an 
average increase of 2.32 (45%) from the contributions in period 16 (mean = 4.52). 
We vary whether information is provided about the composition of the group.   
Information provision increases average contributions in every case.  The average contribution 
increases from 6.29 when no information is provided to 6.53 when information is provided for 
the working juniors, from 7.30 to 7.62 for the working seniors, from 3.74 to 4.54 for the students, 
and from 7.02 to 7.61 for the retirees.16  When information is provided, the effect of 
heterogeneity on the total group contribution is positive in the field data, yet is negative in the 
laboratory.  In companies, mixed groups on average contribute the most, particularly when given 
information about the group composition, as would be natural in a workplace.   
On average, working seniors contribute more when matched with juniors than when 
matched with other working seniors (8.26 versus 7.43, with standard deviations of 4.64 and 
6.03), although they might realize that the latter contribute less on average, as if to teach them 
the ‘good example’ of cooperation.  Working juniors also contribute more on average in 
heterogeneous groups than when matched with other working juniors (6.93 versus 6.35, with 
standard deviations of 5.30 and 5.62).  In contrast, in the laboratory, heterogeneous age groups 
are less cooperative than homogenous groups.  Indeed, when they know that they are interacting 
with seniors, students contribute less (4.33 versus 4.69, with standard deviations of 4.28 and 
                                                
16 The respective standard deviations were 5.25, 5.52, 5.58, 5.74, 4.30, 4.58, and 5.21, and 5.12. 
 
 
 19 
 
 
4.81) than when they know they are matched with other students; similarly, retirees contribute 
less in heterogeneous groups (7.01 versus 8.01, with standard deviations of 4.83 and 5.28).   
There are at least two possible explanations for the difference with behavior across the 
experiments in the field and the laboratory.   One possibility is that, perhaps due to the greater 
difference in age and position in society, both retirees and students cooperate more in their own 
demographic class; in contrast, both the working juniors and seniors may be used to being in 
age-mixed groups at work.  Another possible explanation of the difference between the lab and 
the field reflects a form of reciprocal behavior.  In this case, it would not be the difference in age 
or social position per se that matters, but rather the difference in the average contribution across 
the groups.  Since students contribute far less than retirees, this might explain why retirees 
contribute less in heterogeneous groups than in homogenous ones.  To test whether these 
explanations are complements or substitutes, an econometric analysis is required. 
We therefore estimate a random-effects Tobit model to identify the determinants of 
cooperation in the team-production game.  This panel data analysis accounts for the fact that we 
observe each participant’s decision sixteen times and controls for both the left and right 
censoring of the observations corresponding to the null contribution and the contribution of the 
full endowment, respectively.  The model has been estimated on pooled data from all the 
sessions.   The dependent variable is the amount contributed to the public good. 
The exogenous variables include each age category (with the students being the omitted 
category),17 gender, whether one is a manager, and one’s degree of risk aversion (as reflected by 
the amount invested in the risky asset).  They also include an indicator variable for one of the 
two firms to control for possible corporate culture effects.  To investigate the complementarity or 
                                                
17 We systematically chose the students as the omitted category in the regressions on pooled data since they differ 
from the three other categories of participants in that they have almost no experience as workers. 
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substitutability of the two hypotheses mentioned above, we also include two sets of variables.  
First, we control for whether the participant’s contribution is influenced by the information about 
the generation composition of his or her group.  To do so, we interact the subject’s generation 
and whether he or she is in either a homogenous or a heterogeneous group when this information 
is displayed; the reference level is therefore the situation where the subjects have no information 
on the composition of their group.  These four variables aim at determining whether people 
condition their willingness to cooperate on their level of information and on the age of their 
teammates.  Second, since conditional cooperation is likely, we include in the regressions the 
team members’ average contribution to the public good in the previous period.  We interact this 
variable with the generation to check whether seniors are more, less, or equally conditional than 
juniors.  Next, we control for a likely time trend in the level of contribution.  Finally, we add a 
control for order in the sessions, to check if informing the participants about the composition of 
their team at the beginning of the game influences behavior throughout the game.  Table 2 
reports the results of the regression. 
[Table 2 about here] 
The results in Table 2 indicate that working juniors, working seniors, and retirees are 
significantly more cooperative than students, with the value of the coefficients ranked 
accordingly. We conjecture that this reflects a positive impact of the experience of work on the 
level of cooperation, since students (we again mention that almost none of them hold a part-time 
job) clearly contribute the least.18  In addition, managers are more cooperative.19  We also find 
                                                
18 One may wonder whether the lower rate for students is caused by youth or inexperience.  As the average age for 
students and working juniors is only moderately different (20.6 versus 25.3 years of age), it seems much more likely 
that the behavior differs due to the experience of working. 
19 It has been documented in the literature that people who are assigned the role of leader in public good games 
contribute significantly more than the other subjects whether they are more informed (Jan Potters, Martin Sefton, 
and Lise Vesterlund, 2007) or less informed (Emrah Arbak and Marie-Claire Villeval, 2007) than others.  In our 
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that males contribute significantly less than females, a result that we view with some caution 
given that John Ledyard (1995) and Catherine Eckel and Philip Grossman (2006) report a lack of 
evidence for a systematic difference between men and women in public-goods experiments.  The 
participants who invest more in the risky asset are more willing to cooperate (in separate 
regressions conducted on each sub-sample, this effect is not significant in the lab data, however); 
this makes sense since cooperating in such a game is taking the risk of being a sucker if others 
are free riders.20   
This analysis and the descriptive statistics support our first main finding: 
Result 1:  Seniors, whether working or retired, contribute more than juniors; students 
consistently contribute the least.   
 
There is no strong difference between firms (the coefficient associated with one of the 
companies being only marginally significant in a separate regression on the sub-sample of field 
data).  Contributions decline over time and there is no significant order effect.  Overall, when the 
age composition of the group is made public information, it does not influence behavior 
significantly in the pooled data.  In contrast, not surprisingly, we find that the participants 
condition their behavior on the contribution level of their teammates in the previous period.  We 
see that this is somewhat less true for the seniors, as they are significantly less conditional than 
the juniors (although the net coefficient for seniors is still .240); this result perhaps explains the 
smoother evolution of their contributions over time, as seen in Figure 1.21 
                                                
game, there is no role differentiation, but managers may import to the lab their experience as leaders in the firms 
where they may also wish to contribute more to lead by example.   
20 A negative relationship between risk aversion and cooperation in a repeated prisoner’s dilemma game has also 
been documented in Gerardo Sabater-Grande and Nikolaos Georgantzis (2002). 
21 In this sense, seniors may be seen as less adaptable; however, the flip side is that this may reflect having more 
experience, as well as having more principled and deeply-held views that sustained cooperation is socially-
beneficial. 
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However, when the same regressions are estimated on the sub-samples of working and 
non-working populations (not reported here, but available upon request), we find that controlling 
for the contribution level of their teammates in the previous period, seniors contribute more in 
heterogeneous groups in the field and in homogenous groups in the lab.  This cannot be fully 
explained in terms of reciprocal behavior.  In a firm environment, the working seniors value 
cooperating with juniors, as if trying to provide a good example to the juniors by taking the lead 
in contributing more.  In contrast, the retirees put positive value on cooperating with other 
retirees.  This analysis supports our second result: 
Result 2: Working seniors cooperate more with working juniors, while retirees are more 
cooperative when they interact with retirees, conditional on their group members’ 
contributions in the previous period. 
 
This second result leads to the question of whether the different categories of subjects 
have different preferences regarding matching in terms of generation.  We examine the results of 
the selection treatment played in period 17.  In Table 3, we analyze the determinants of the 
desired number of senior teammates, using an ordered-probit model, in which the explained 
variable can take values 0, 1, or 2.  The explanatory variables include the generation categories, 
the gender, being a manager.  We also include a dummy variable for one firm and a variable 
indicating whether the participant was aware of having been matched with seniors in previous 
periods of the game.  This variable measures the conscious experience of seniors’ contribution 
behavior in this game.  
[Table 3 about here]  
The regression in Table 3 supports our third result: 
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Result 3: People have a preference for heterogeneous teams, since the number of desired 
senior teammates is significantly negatively correlated with being a senior.  However, 
managers show a reluctance to be matched with seniors. 
 
 
There is no difference between students and working juniors in their matching 
preferences.22  This is not related to their experience with seniors, as this variable is not 
significant.  We also find that managers prefer (at a marginally-significant level) to be matched 
with fewer seniors, controlling for the subject’s generation and experience of the seniors’ 
behavior in previous periods. 
To delve more deeply into the motivation of such choices, one must examine contribution 
behavior in the selection treatment.   We have estimated the determinants of the contribution in 
period 17, using a Tobit model that accounts for the left and right censoring of the data (not 
reported here).  The dependent variable is the amount contributed by the subject to the public 
good in period 17.   In addition to the explanatory variables included in the previous regression, 
we include a dummy variable indicating if the subject is in an age-heterogeneous group and the 
number of chosen senior group members.  The only (marginally) significant variables (p = 0.052 
and p = 0.060, respectively, two-tailed tests) in a regression on pooled data are the dummy 
variables for being a senior and for being in an age-heterogeneous team, which both increase the 
individual contributions in the selection treatment.  However, regressions conducted on the sub-
samples of working and non-working populations show that the second effect is statistically 
significant in the field, but not at all so in the lab.  These regressions support our fourth finding: 
Result 4: When group formation is endogenous, age-heterogeneous teams are more 
cooperative than age-homogeneous teams in the field, but not significantly so in the lab.   
 
                                                
22 This confirms the descriptive statistics since only 15.9% of the working juniors and 18.9% of the students prefer 
to be matched with two juniors, 
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In the field, this result is consistent with the previous ones showing that the working 
seniors contribute more in heterogeneous groups.  However the positive impact of diversity in 
the field is not linearly related to the number of seniors in a group.  In contrast, in the lab, the 
number of senior group members decreases (p = 0.060, two-tailed test) the amount contributed 
by the subject to the public good.  In fact, students are willing to be matched with seniors and, 
conditional on this choice, they reduce the amount of their contribution as the number of retirees 
in the group increases.  In other words, they act opportunistically and try to exploit the retirees.   
This is confirmed by another regression on the sub-sample of students (not reported here) 
showing that the probability of choosing senior group members is negatively related to one’s 
own average contribution during the first 16 periods of the game (significant at the 1% level): the 
more the students free rode in the past, the more they wish to interact with retirees.  In contrast, 
the coefficient associated with this variable is positive and marginally significant in the same 
regression conducted on the sub-sample of working juniors: the more the working juniors 
cooperated in the past, the more likely they are willing to interact with seniors.  This result 
suggests that a different logic operates among working juniors than among students: the more 
cooperative working juniors are also more integrative of seniors for the sake of efficiency 
(choosing to be in a heterogeneous team increases contribution); the less cooperative students are 
also integrative of seniors but for the sake of taking advantage of them.   The experience of work 
in a mixed environment may help to explain these different behaviors. 
4.3 Attitudes toward competition and productivity in the real-effort task  
The entry rate in the tournament is 0.676 for students, 0.705 for working juniors, 0.649 
for working seniors, and 0.514 for retirees. Juniors enter the tournament more frequently than 
seniors do; the difference is largest for students and retirees.  
 
 
 25 
 
 
The decision to enter the competition is likely influenced by beliefs about one’s ability, 
especially relative ability.  The first column of Table 4 shows the beliefs about own performance 
(self-confidence) in number of words created for the individuals who chose the pay scheme 
based on absolute performance and those who chose the tournament.  The second column 
indicates the beliefs about the others’ ability, i.e. the number of words the individuals believe the 
generation of their co-participant is able to create.  The third column gives the rate of individuals 
who believe they are able to create more words than the generation of their co-participant (and 
potential opponent in the competition), since they report a higher belief about themselves than 
about the generation of their co-participant. 
[Table 4 about here]  
 
We observe a consistent pattern in Table 4: for every group, those people who choose the 
tournament are more self-confident than those who choose the pay scheme based on absolute 
performance.  However, the difference between the beliefs of working seniors who enter the 
tournament and those who do not is small.  Does this mean that they are avoiding competition 
despite having sufficient skill to compete?  The choice of the pay scheme depends on the beliefs 
about relative ability rather than beliefs on absolute performance: what matters indeed when 
involved in a tournament is to outperform the competitor, whatever one’s own performance.  The 
working seniors choosing absolute pay feel less able on average than the generation of their 
competitor, and those who choose the tournament feel slightly less able than the generation of 
their competitor.  This may have discouraged some of them from competing, but it also indicates 
that they do not need to feel much more able than their competitor to choose the tournament.  
The difference between beliefs in own and others’ ability is considerably higher for the students 
and retirees who chose the tournament than for those who did not.  Moreover, with the exception 
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of the working juniors, the proportion of individuals who believe they are more able than their 
co-participant is considerably higher among those who chose the tournament.23  
Figure 2 shows the average performance for each subpopulation, according to whether 
people chose the pay scheme based on absolute performance, entered the tournament and won by 
default (when the co-participant has chosen not to compete), or entered the tournament and 
actually competed against another person who entered the tournament. 
[Figure 2 about here]  
 Every group produces more words when choosing the tournament and actually competing 
than when choosing absolute performance pay.  Despite the fact that the strongest incentive to 
produce more words applies when one has won the tournament by default (the payment of 30 
points per anagram is certain), all groups except retirees produce substantially more words when 
in an actual competition than when they win the tournament by default.  According to Wilcoxon 
signed-rank tests, the difference is significant for working juniors (p = 0.031), working seniors (p 
= 0.004) and students (p = 0.003), but it is not significant for retirees (p = 0.236); this might 
suggest that people derive utility from winning.  Working people seem to be much more 
motivated by actual competition, compared to winning the tournament by default; performance is 
more than 50% higher for this comparison in the workplace, but less than 15% higher in the 
laboratory.  Being no longer in a competitive framework, retirees might derive less utility from 
winning and this could explain why their performance is similar in both types of tournaments. 
                                                
23 It should be noted that overall, working participants (and especially working juniors) report lower expected 
ability.  Comparing the individuals’ beliefs about own ability and the ability of own generation, we find that seniors 
are more under-confident than juniors. For example, while 29.2% of the working juniors and 40.5% of the students 
believe they are better than the average of their generation (the other categories were being about the same as the 
average or being worse), the respective figures for working seniors and retirees are 20.5% and 22.9%.  Nevertheless, 
while the working seniors are relatively under-confident, their rate of tournament entry is not significantly lower 
than that of students or working juniors (see Table 5). 
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To analyze the determinants of the individual performance, we estimate on pooled data a 
model with a correction for the potential selection bias due to the choice of the payment scheme.  
To achieve this, we use the Heckman two-step estimation procedure.  We first study the 
determinants of choosing the tournament payment scheme using a Probit model.  We then 
explain the number of words created, conditional on that decision, with an OLS model corrected 
for the selection bias.  
In both regressions, the variables for individual characteristics include generation, gender, 
whether the participant is a manager, and whether one is working for one of the two firms; the 
students are the omitted category.  In the selection equation, we also include a variable indicating 
whether the participant is paired with a senior in this game, since stereotypes regarding the lower 
competitiveness of seniors may have a positive influence on the decision to compete.  We control 
for the amount invested in the risky asset and we include a dummy variable regarding beliefs 
about relative ability, indicating whether the individual believes he or she is more able than the 
generation of his or her co-participant.  We hypothesize that people who feel more able than the 
age category of their co-participants are more willing to compete.  In the performance equation, 
we instead include a variable indicating beliefs about own absolute performance.   
Several variables characterize the environment: one indicates whether the competition 
involves both the participant and his or her co-participant; we interact this variable with being a 
senior to identify whether performance is affected by the competition and, if this is the case, 
whether the influence is similar on seniors and on juniors. We also control for the set of letters 
that was used to perform the task to test whether one set was easier than the other.   We omit 
some variables that were included in the selection equation to identify the model, in particular 
the beliefs about relative ability and the risk attitude variables.  Finally, we include in this 
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performance equation the inverse of the Mill’s ratio (the “IMR” variable) to control for a 
potential selection bias arising from the first-stage decision. Table 5 displays the results from 
these regressions. 
[Table 5 about here] 
The first regression indicates that the retirees are marginally less likely to choose the 
tournament than the students; moreover, when one restricts the sample to the non-working 
population (not reported here, but available upon request), it turns out that the retirees are not 
less competitive than the students.   In addition, we find that there is no significant difference 
between working seniors, working juniors, and students.  We do not find any evidence of a 
gender effect, although it has been shown with a different task that females tend to shy away 
from competition (Muriel Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007); our results indicate that the gender 
gap in competitiveness is not systematic.  Perhaps not surprisingly (since it is a risky decision), 
the probability of choosing the tournament is positively influenced by the amount invested in the 
risky asset.  Managers are also more willing to compete, perhaps because they are more used to 
doing so in their occupation. 
Logically, people are influenced by their belief about their relative ability.  Indeed, 
believing one is better than an average potential competitor increases the probability one chooses 
the tournament.  Interestingly, this decision to compete is not influenced by the generation of the 
opponent, except in the working population sample: controlling for the other variables, being 
matched with a working senior in this game increases the probability of choosing the 
tournament.  An interpretation is that the participants believe that the working seniors are less 
likely to choose the competitive payment scheme (true, but not significantly so; Z = 0.54), so that 
it gives them an additional reason to opt for the tournament.  This leads to Result 5. 
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Result 5: Only retirees are less willing to compete than the other age categories and only 
marginally so.  In the non-working population, the decision to compete is mainly influenced 
by beliefs about relative ability whereas in the working population, controlling for these 
beliefs, being matched with a senior reinforces one’s competitiveness. 
  
An additional issue is that if one has preferences for total social payoffs (e.g. Charness 
and Matthew Rabin, 2002), there may also be a motivation present for opting out of the 
tournament.  The most efficient joint choice is for one person to choose the tournament and for 
the other person to choose the absolute performance scheme.  Thus, a socially-motivated 
individual may choose the absolute pay scheme if he or she believes the other person is choosing 
the tournament.  While we do not measure social preferences, results from Fehr et al. (2002), 
Bellemare and Kröger (2007) and Sutter and Kocher (2007) suggest that seniors may care more 
about total social payoffs, since they are more generous as responders in a trust game than are 
younger people.24  To the extent that this is the case, the difference in the entry rates for juniors 
and seniors may overstate any underlying difference in competitiveness.  
Finally, the second regression in Table 5 indicates that, despite differences in the 
education level, the level of performance is similar across subpopulations. Generally, the self-
confident participants do perform better than those who are less confident.  Confirming the 
descriptive statistics, the reality of the competition – and the associated risk of getting a low 
payment – makes most people work harder than when the co-participant has chosen the pay 
scheme based on absolute performance, in which case the high payment is certain.  Relative to 
students, there is no significant difference for the effect of competition on working seniors; 
however, the retirees react marginally less strongly to competition.  There is no significant 
                                                
24 Older people are less trusting in some of these studies, but this is a strategic choice; being less trusting is not the 
same as being less cooperative. 
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impact from the other variables, such as gender, occupational category, or the nature of the task.  
This leads to our last result. 
Result 6: Working seniors do not react to competitive incentives significantly less strongly 
than younger people in general.  Only retirees are less reactive to competition. 
 
 
5.  DISCUSSION 
We test seniors and juniors in experimental games and tasks designed to shed some light 
on their relative behavior and performance, both in the workplace and in the laboratory.  We are 
concerned with three dimensions that would seem to be quite important for the performance of 
firms: attitudes towards risk, cooperation, and competition.  If seniors are afraid to take risks, are 
less cooperative, and are less competitive, they might well be less valuable in the workplace.   
However, our experimental data do not support this view; instead, if one accepts our 
games and tasks as proxies for field concerns, seniors appear to be at least as valuable as juniors.  
We find no difference between juniors and seniors in terms of risk aversion.  In a task involving 
real effort in either a pay scheme based on absolute performance or in a tournament, only retirees 
are less willing to enter the tournament.  In addition, in the competition, working seniors react to 
incentives as strongly as juniors, rather than being inflexible in their behavior.  Finally, our 
results from the team-production game suggest that working seniors are particularly valuable, 
both because they contribute more and because the heterogeneity they provide leads to better 
outcomes.  Working seniors increase their contributions when aware they are teamed with 
juniors, and they are especially willing to interact with juniors.  One interpretation is that they are 
interested in teaching the juniors the benefits of group cooperation.25  
                                                
25 This higher cooperation by seniors seems a strong result because it suggests that their work experience did not 
lead them to become more selfish, but instead that experience taught them that cooperation pays off (or perhaps that 
 
 
 31 
 
 
If one accepts these results at face value, they suggest that it is worthwhile to keep 
seniors in the work force. This issue is particularly acute in countries such as France and 
Germany, although the prevalent age discrimination in the United States makes it clear that this 
is a real problem there as well.  Much of the problem seems to stem from the demand side, 
despite the introduction of taxes against the firing of seniors.26   It is not our primary goal to find 
evidence of age discrimination in our experiments; nevertheless, our results indicate that, when 
given the possibility of choosing their group members in the cooperation game, managers are 
less likely than the other categories to choose seniors.27  Our behavioral analysis of the impact of 
aging on cooperation and on the willingness to compete suggests directions for governments and 
firms to confront a potential shortage of workers in the coming years, as seniors may be willing 
to stay on the job given appropriate incentives, thereby providing both a supply of workers and 
valuable heterogeneity in a firm’s work force. 
It is interesting that we see little evidence of negative attitudes towards senior workers by 
junior workers, as they have a taste for senior teammates in the team-production game and 
increase their contributions in age-heterogeneous groups.28   In contrast, while students also seek 
senior teammates, it appears that they do so for the purpose of exploiting them, as they lower 
their contributions when paired with seniors.  This suggests that they must learn to become team 
players to be particularly useful to potential employers. 
                                                
failure to cooperate can be punished in the workplace). Seniors are not simply indifferent to the others’ behavior, 
since we also find that working seniors are sensitive to the past contribution of their teammates.  
26 Some companies have however started to care about diversity management and seem aware of the benefits of such 
a policy.  For example, BMW has begun to hire older workers to avoid an unbalanced age structure of the work 
force in many parts of the company (see Grund and Westergård-Nielsen 2005).  Nevertheless, participation rates for 
older workers remain low and it is still unusual for a senior worker to be replaced by another senior worker.   
27 Of course, we do not have any top executives or human resource managers participating in our sessions, so the 
managers in our study are not likely to be making hiring or retention decisions.  Nevertheless, people who make 
these decisions may well seek the advice of the managers. 
28 However, the fact that being matched with a working senior reinforces one’s competitiveness, controlling for 
beliefs about relative ability, suggests that workers expect seniors to be less competitive. 
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Some human resources managers claim that the seniors may lack motivation if they have 
to stay longer in companies.  Our results show that seniors react to incentives; this may mean that 
if new incentive schemes are introduced late in a career, seniors’ performance could be improved 
because new perspectives would be offered.  Indeed, keeping seniors at work and fighting 
against age discrimination also raise the issue of the management of incentives at the end of 
one’s career.  To prolong or to restore the seniors’ motivation, perhaps there is a need for the 
development of new career ladders, opportunities, and incentive schemes.  Our experiment also 
shows that working seniors are not substantially less attracted by competition than juniors, and 
they greatly increase their performance when they learn they must compete instead of winning a 
tournament by default.   Facing such a competitive incentive, they perform as well as juniors.  
But the analysis of beliefs about relative ability also shows that seniors tend to underestimate 
their true ability relative to that of their age category.  This bias may influence their behavior 
regarding the choice of incentive schemes. 
Finally, a novel aspect of our study is the comparison between the behavior of actual 
workers and non-workers. While we find many results that are similar across these groups, we 
also find some interesting contrasts.  For example, workers seem to be more attracted to 
competition than non-workers, although this is driven by the lower likelihood of the retirees to 
choose the tournament.  In addition, winning by competing per se (instead of receiving the high 
payment by default) seems to motivate workers more than non-workers, suggesting that retirees 
derive less intrinsic utility from winning.  Another difference is that students behave more 
selfishly and free ride more on the seniors’ contributions than the other categories.  This suggests 
that the integration in the workplace contributes to people becoming more socially-oriented. 
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6. CONCLUSION 
The employment of seniors has become a major issue in most developed countries.  The 
difficulties in funding the pension systems and the end of the early retirement plans provided by 
firms are such that there is an additional potential older work force.  However, these early 
retirement programs may have introduced several distortions playing against the demand for 
seniors, either because they have contributed to reducing the work motivation of those 
employees approaching the age of early retirement, or because they have disseminated 
stereotypes about their lower productivity and adaptability.  
We obtain results that we regard as important for a better understanding of the behavioral 
dimensions of skill and productivity that should play against age discrimination at work.   
Seniors are more cooperative even where there is a strong incentive to free ride on the 
contribution of others.  Another key result is that heterogeneous teams contribute more than 
homogenous ones in the sessions involving active workers.  When they know they are teamed 
with juniors, working seniors cooperate more than in all-senior teams.  Finally, the seniors who 
choose to compete in a tournament perform essentially as well as juniors. 
These results are at variance with the widespread stereotypes about seniors, seen 
anecdotally and in several surveys in both the United States and Europe.  Seniors are perceived 
to be less adaptable, overly cautious, and less willing to learn.  These views undoubtedly 
contribute to age discrimination against seniors in the workplace.  We show however that 
working seniors are as reactive and productive as juniors when competing against an opponent.  
Overall these findings tend to show that seniors constitute a valuable work force and 
suggest that age diversity is a potential source of improved performance, provided that the 
willingness to cooperate is not too different for the juniors and seniors.  Of course, this does not 
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take into account issues such as seniority wage premia, possibly lower cognitive ability for 
seniors in terms of learning new tasks, and a shorter period of return to human capital 
investment.  Further, since the degree of optimal risk aversion, competitiveness, and 
cooperativeness is likely to vary across industries, no general claim can be made.  In any event, 
while reasons for preferring younger applicants do exist, we are suggesting that hiring seniors 
may have advantages and that some of the perceived disadvantages may not be present.  
Beyond implications for personnel policies, our results provide evidence regarding the 
evolution of cooperation and competition.  Our finding that seniors are more willing to 
contribute than juniors supports the argument that culture is a determinant of economic behavior, 
and that this is learned through experience. In combination with the Harbaugh et al. (2003) 
study, our results lead us to conjecture that there is a long-life learning process and that 
cooperation is a learned trait.  The insight developed over a more elderly person’s lifetime may 
be particularly useful in providing a good example for younger workers to emulate.  Perhaps 
most directly, an implication of our experimental results is that not accounting for this higher 
cooperativeness biases the measure of the relative cost of recruiting older employees. 
It is clear that we have only made a start, and that more work needs to be done in this 
area.  Our study also has a number of limitations.  One is that we have only tested workers at two 
firms in France and clearly cannot claim to have identified a representative sample of the global 
working population.29  A second limitation is that our experimental games and artificial tasks are 
only imperfect proxies for the work environment; of course, this limitation also applies to 
perhaps all experimental labor studies.  In any case, the experimental evidence we have obtained 
                                                
29 However, the fact that the Firm X dummy is rarely significant in our regressions is encouraging. 
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does offer some insights, and we hope that our findings will lead to further study and help to 
influence policy regarding the employment and retention of senior workers. 
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 Table 2: Determinants of cooperation in the team production game  
(Random-effects Tobit model) 
Dep. variable: Amount contributed to the public good Coefficients Standard errors 
Student 
 
Working junior 
 
Working senior 
 
Retiree 
 
Firm X 
 
Gender (male=1) 
 
Manager 
 
Investment in risky asset 
 
Senior in homogenous group –public info 
 
Junior in homogenous group – public info 
 
Senior in heterogeneous group – public info 
 
Junior in heterogeneous group – public info 
 
Average lagged contribution of group members 
 
Average lagged contribution of group members*Senior 
  
Time trend 
 
Order 
 
Constant 
Ref. 
 
1.617** 
 
3.361*** 
 
3.928*** 
 
-0.693 
 
-1.409*** 
 
1.384** 
 
0.016** 
 
0.533 
 
0.615 
 
0.719 
 
0.297 
 
0.427*** 
 
-0.187*** 
 
-0.148*** 
 
-0.361 
 
3.442*** 
 
 
0.651 
 
0.835 
 
0.720 
 
0.583 
 
0.428 
 
0.621 
 
0.007 
 
0.398 
 
0.386 
 
0.493 
 
0.450 
 
0.044 
 
0.064 
 
0.026 
 
0.406 
 
0.681 
Nb observations 
Left/right censored obs. 
Log likelihood 
LR  
Prob>  
 
2010 
343 / 52 
-5340.981 
236.67 
0.000 
0.383** 
 
 
Note: *** significant at the 0.01 level; ** at the 0.05 level; * at the 0.1 level. 
 
 
 ii 
 
 
Table 3: Desired number of senior teammates in the selection treatment (Ordered Probit) 
 
Dep. variable: Desired 
number of senior team mates 
Coefficients Standard Errors 
Student 
 
Working junior 
 
Working senior 
 
Retiree 
 
Firm X 
 
Gender (male=1) 
 
Manager 
 
Experience with seniors 
Ref. 
 
-0.138 
 
-0.700** 
 
-1.024*** 
 
-0.163 
 
0.337* 
 
-0.488* 
 
-0.053 
 
 
 
0.315 
 
0.331 
 
0.305 
 
 0.265 
 
0.193 
 
0.281 
 
0.133 
Nb observations 
Log likelihood 
LR  
Prob>  
Pseudo R2 
153 
-154.352 
23.54 
0.001 
0.071 
 
Note: *** significant at the 0.01 level; ** at the 0.05 level; * at the 0.1 level. 
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 Table 4: Own-performance beliefs and chosen pay scheme 
Beliefs about own 
ability (1)* 
Beliefs about others’ 
ability (2)** 
Beliefs about relative 
ability (3)*** 
Location Group 
Absolute 
Perform. 
Relative 
Perform 
Absolute 
Perform. 
Relative 
Perform. 
Absolute 
Perform. 
Relative 
Perform. 
Juniors 4.00 (1.22) 
6.26 
(2.35) 
5.85 
(2.51) 
8.03 
(5.02) 0.154 0.129 
Seniors 7.23 (5.93) 
7.83 
(6.58) 
8.08 
(5.99) 
7.92 
(5.13) 0.231 0.292 
 
 
Field 
   Total 5.62 (4.51) 
6.95 
(4.70) 
6.96 
(4.64) 
7.98 
(5.02) 0.192 0.200 
        
Students 7.50 (5.23) 
8.12 
(5.47) 
10.33 
(11.70) 
7.67 
(4.68) 0.083 0.360 
Retirees 5.94 (3.27) 
11.44 
(12.19) 
7.12 
(4.57) 
10.61 
(11.00) 0.059 0.500 
 
 
Lab 
   Total 6.58 (4.18) 
9.51 
(8.95) 
8.45 
(8.26) 
8.03 
(8.04) 0.069 0.419 
     
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses. Absolute performance and relative performance represent the 
chosen payment schemes (tournament and fixed-pay-per-word, respectively).   
*Beliefs about one’s ability are the average number of words the subjects believe they are able to create. 
**Beliefs about others’ ability are the number of words the subjects believe the age category of their co-
participant is able to create on average. 
***Beliefs about relative ability represent the proportion of subjects who believe they are better than the average 
age category of their co-participant. 
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Table 5: Determinants of behavior in the competition game (Heckman 2-step procedure) 
Exogenous variables Tournament entry Probit  (1) 
Performance 
OLS (2) 
Student 
 
Working junior 
 
Working senior 
 
Retiree 
 
Firm X 
 
Senior opponent 
 
Gender (male=1) 
 
Manager 
 
Amount invested 
 
Belief on own ability 
 
Belief on relative ability 
 
Competition 
 
Working Senior in competition 
 
Retiree in competition 
 
Set of letters 
 
Constant 
 
IMR 
 
Ref. 
 
0.362 
(0.402) 
-0.064 
(0.414) 
-0.630* 
(0.347) 
-0.802** 
(0.405) 
0.430 
(0.276) 
-0.191 
(0.257) 
0.845* 
(0.455) 
0.012** 
(0.005) 
- 
 
 
1.203*** 
(0.345) 
 
- 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
-0.471 
(0.353) 
- 
Ref. 
 
-1.756 
(1.153) 
-2.875 
(2.056) 
0.624 
(1.448) 
-1.232 
(1.318) 
- 
 
0.305 
(0.773) 
1.866 
(1.251) 
- 
 
0.267*** 
(0.056) 
 
- 
 
 
2.502** 
(1.026) 
1.319 
(2.276) 
 
-3.301* 
(1.854) 
 
-0.441 
(0.801) 
7.046*** 
(1.440) 
      0.646 
(1.332) 
Nb observations 
Wald χ 2  
Prob> χ 2  
129 
65.94 
0.000 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.  *** significant at the 0.01 level; ** at the 0.05 level; * at the 0.1 level. 
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Figure 1: Avg. individual contributions over time
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Note: Periods 9 and 17 correspond to a new grouping within groups.
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Note: Numbers on top of each bar represent the average performance in each configuration. In the piece-
rate pay scheme, the standard deviations are 2.39 for the students, 4.31 for the retirees, 4.09 for the working 
juniors and 5.87 for the working seniors. In the tournament scheme by default, these standard deviations are 
4.80, 4.01, 3.55, and 2.12, respectively. In the tournament with competition, they are 3.39, 5.11, 4.50, and 
5.30, respectively.  
